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IN THE UNITED STATES COURT 
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
NO. 04-2211
                    
 KEVIN POWELL,
Appellant
v.
ROBERT W. MEYERS; THE DISTRICT
ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA; 
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
                    
On Appeal From the United States 
District Court
For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 03-cv-03667)
District Judge:  Hon. John P. Fullam
                   
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 17, 2007
BEFORE:  McKEE, AMBRO and STAPLETON,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed January 24, 2007)
                    
     The Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the “induced plea” claim on the ground that1
Powell had failed to “make an assertion of his innocence,” as required by 42 Pa. Con.
Stat. Ann. § 9543(a)(2)(iii).
2
                    
OPINION OF THE COURT
                    
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
Appellant Kevin Powell sought a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court
asserting that his nolo contendere plea in state court was induced by inaccurate statements
of the law and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea hearing. 
The District Court declined to grant habeas relief, and this timely appeal followed.  We
will affirm.
We have grave doubts about whether Powell’s wrongful inducement challenge to
his plea was fairly presented to the state courts as a federal constitutional claim.  It was
understandably not regarded as such by those courts.   Both claims arise out of the same1
event, however, and our resolution of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim resolves
the “induced plea” claim as well.  Under those circumstances, we will exercise our
prerogative to resolve both claims on their merits.  23 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2); Bronshtein v.
Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 725 & 728 (3d Cir. 2005).
At the outset of the plea hearing, defense counsel stated in open court that Powell’s
3sentence would not run concurrently with any back-time sentences imposed by the State
Parole Board for parole violations, which is an entirely accurate statement of
Pennsylvania law.  Although the trial court responded that “I will make it concurrent to
everything, and then they [i.e., the State Parole Board]  will make a [determination]
whether it’s concurrent to any back time,” App. at 108, defense counsel thereafter made it
clear to Powell on the record that he should “not expect” his sentence to run concurrent to
any back-time sentences imposed by the State Parole Board.  Id.  While the comments of
the trial court (including several other remarks during the course of the plea colloquy), as
qualified by defense counsel’s admonition to Powell, may have given Powell the
misimpression that there was at least a chance that the State Parole Board would impose a
concurrent back-time sentence, that misimpression would not provide a basis for habeas
relief under the circumstances of this case.
I.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984),
applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.  Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985).  Thus, Powell is required to show that his attorney’s
conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonable competence under prevailing
norms, and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of his
case would have been different.  As explained in Hill, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
4counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial.”  Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.    
A.  Performance
There is no doubt that plea counsel’s first statement to the trial court (“if he should
be serving back time now, or later he gets back time, that [the instant sentence is] not
concurrent to back time”) was an entirely accurate statement of the applicable law.  After
the court responded that it would make Powell’s sentence “concurrent to everything and
then they will make a [determination] whether it’s concurrent to any back time,” however,
plea counsel slightly retreated from her initial position by stating that “so if it works out
in his favor that’s great, but he is being told now not to expect that.”  App. at 108.  While
Powell contends that plea counsel’s response revealed that she was “unaware” of the
governing law, we disagree.  Reading plea counsel’s two statements together, it is clear
that she did not believe, based on her actual knowledge of the law, that the State Parole
Board would impose a concurrent back-time sentence, but simply saw no reason to
completely foreclose that possibility, however remote she believed it was, by insisting
that the trial court make Powell’s sentence consecutive to any back-time sentences.  The
problem here arose not from counsel’s ignorance of the law, but rather from the court’s
misimpression regarding it.  Given the delicate situation with which counsel was
confronted, we believe she handled the situation reasonably well.  After accurately
advising the court regarding the applicable law, she did not challenge the court when it
5suggested the possibility of concurrent sentences.  Far from positively assuring or
guaranteeing this result, however, plea counsel affirmatively stated that it was her belief
(and, indeed, part of the “offer . . . that [Powell] would be accepting,” App. at 108) that
such sentences would not be concurrent and further admonished Powell not to expect a
contrary determination by the State Parole Board. We agree with the PCRA Court and the
District Court that Powell has not rebutted the strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance under Strickland.
B.  Prejudice
Although the state courts disposed of Powell’s ineffectiveness claim on
performance grounds, we conclude that it falls short of satisfying Strickland’s second
element as well.  “A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in the guilty plea
context must make more than a bare allegation that but for counsel’s error he would have
pleaded not guilty and gone to trial.”  Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110, 118 (3d Cir.
1995).  
Powell does not even assert in his brief on this appeal that he would have insisted
on going to trial had he known that it was legally impossible for his back-time sentence to
be served concurrently with his instant sentence.  Rather, he states only that “counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced [him] . . . [because he] was sentenced to an additional
period of incarceration that he thought he had the opportunity to avoid.”  Appellant Br. at
21.  This is not surprising.  Overwhelming evidence of Powell’s guilt  was proffered at
6the plea hearing, see App. at 113.  See United States v. Nino, 878 F.2d 101, 105 (3d Cir.
1989) (finding no prejudice under Strickland where “the record . . . is replete with
evidence of petitioner’s guilt”).  Moreover, Powell knew that the charges to which he
pleaded nolo contendere could result in a very substantial penalty; the record shows that
Powell was advised of, and understood, the maximum sentences for robbery and his other
offenses.  See App. at 109-10.  Given his knowledge (1) that his plea would expose him
to such serious punishment, (2) that trial did not offer a realistic way out, and (3) that the
chance of concurrent sentences was not to be expected, it would be highly unlikely that
elimination of the possibility of such sentences would play a determinative role in
Powell’s plea decision.  
There is also no suggestion in the record that Powell’s nolo contendere plea was in
any way conditioned on the remote possibility that his back-time sentence would run
concurrently with his instant sentence.  Instead, it shows that Powell’s only hesitation in
entering his plea related to the payment of restitution and court costs.  See App. at 114
([DEFENSE COUNSEL]: “My client is saying that . . . the condition of his plea is that he
get in writing today a form now in which . . . you will indicate that . . . the court costs and
any restitution which you would impose would not be payable until he is released from
custody.  Is that what you were asking me? [DEFENDANT]: Yes. [THE COURT]: Okay. 
That will be done.  We will get a short certificate which states that.”); see Hill, 474 U.S.
at 59 (rejecting prejudice argument where petitioner “alleged no special circumstances
7that might support the conclusion that he placed particular emphasis on his parole
eligibility in deciding whether or not to plead guilty”); Parry, 64 F.3d at 118 (finding no
prejudice where, among other things, “[t]he record [did] not substantiate that Parry was
reluctant to plead guilty . . . .”).   Under these circumstances, there is no absolutely no
reason to believe that, but for the alleged errors by his plea counsel, Powell would have
pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.
II.  Induced Plea
Any misimpression about there being some possibility of concurrent sentences
cannot be said to have “induced” Powell’s plea unless there was a causal connection
between the plea and that possibility – i.e., unless knowledge of the absence of such a
possibility would have resulted in his going to trial.  See Clemmons v. United States, 721
F.2d 235, 238 (8th Cir. 1983) (although the court mistakenly advised petitioner that it had
the power to impose concurrent sentences, his involuntary plea claim failed because the
mistaken advice was not “a substantial motivating factor as far as Clemmons was
concerned”).  As we have explained, Powell entered his plea knowing that his sentence
would very likely run consecutively to any back-time sentences, and he does not claim
before us that he would have acted differently had he known that possibility was non-
existent rather than remote.
III.  Conclusion
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
